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THE MYSTERY OF LIFE IN THE LABORATORY OF
DEMOCRACY: PERSONAL AUTONOMY IN STATE
LAW
ADAM J. MACLEOD*
Recent controversies, such as enactment of an individual mandate to purchase
health insurance and the legalization of assisted suicide in Washington and
Montana, have renewed the war over personal autonomy. Debates about the value
and limits of personal autonomy also play major roles in the controversies over
abortion, same-sex intimacy, and same-sex marriage. On one side of the autonomy
war, advocates of unfettered individual freedom assert that by her un-coerced and
autonomous choice the individual person determines the value of human goods such
as life, health, and marriage.
On the other side, proponents of strong government restrictions on personal
choice hold that personal autonomy conflicts with personal responsibility. This view
is used to support strong government restrictions not only on assisted suicide and
marriage, but also on the consumption of drugs, cigarettes, and alcohol; and
recently on economic activities, such as the decision on whether to purchase health
insurance.
This article attempts to carve a path between the two sides in this autonomy war.
It begins by bringing into dialogue with each other four of the most influential legal
philosophers of our day: Joseph Raz, Ronald Dworkin, John Finnis, and Robert
George. Each of these four scholars makes bold and instructive claims about the
value and limits of personal autonomy. The article then examines several different
areas of state law where one might expect a principle of autonomy to be implicated,
and articulates six important lessons that one can glean from state law about the
relationship between personal autonomy and other human goods.
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I. INTRODUCTION: THE AUTONOMY WAR

Debates about personal autonomy today play major roles in controversial legal
and political debates. Arguments in favor of legal rights for assisted suicide,1
abortion,2 same-sex intimacy3 and same-sex marriage,4 and for an expansive
religious liberty to engage in self-harmful conduct5 often share a common
presupposition: that by her un-coerced and autonomous choice the individual person
determines the value of certain human goods, such as life, health, and marriage. On
this account, the law’s reach must be curtailed (or, in the case of same-sex marriage
supplanting conjugal marriage, a private association should no longer enjoy a
privileged place in law) so that the individual can exercise her autonomy in a
capacious legal environment. Particularly in matters of religion, morals, and selfharm, where the conduct at issue is perceived not to affect third parties, the principle
of personal autonomy is understood to militate in favor of more freedom rather than
less. Laws that deflect self-harmful conduct are thought to fail to respect the
individual’s claim to personal autonomy.
On the other side of the debate many prominent thinkers and lawmakers hold that
personal autonomy conflicts with personal responsibility. Give people too much
freedom, these folks argue, and they will become irresponsible citizens. Some goods
cannot be realized unless citizens are coerced to contribute to the collective good of
all.
Thus two conflicting views about the value and limitations of autonomy have
arisen. They are easily caricatured because they are both so extreme. On one hand,
the belief that personal autonomy militates in favor of ever-expansive liberty is
generally expressed with no limitations. This view found its most famous
expression in Justice Kennedy’s now well-worn claim from Planned Parenthood of
Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,
Our law affords constitutional protection to personal decisions relating to
marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, child rearing,
and education . . . These matters, involving the most intimate and personal
choices a person may make in a lifetime, choices central to personal
dignity and autonomy, are central to the liberty protected by the
1

Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 735 (1997).

2

Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).

3

Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 572-74 (2003).

4

Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 948 (Mass. 2003).

5

Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990). See also ANDY
G. OLREE, THE CHOICE PRINCIPLE: THE BIBLICAL CASE FOR LEGAL TOLERATION 130-47
(2006).
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Fourteenth Amendment. At the heart of liberty is the right to define one’s
own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery
of human life. Beliefs about these matters could not define the attributes
of personhood were they formed under compulsion of the State.6
This conception of constitutional protections places personal autonomy on an exalted
perch, above the other human goods that Justice Kennedy alluded to. The value of
other human goods such as life, marriage, and knowledge is determined by
individual choice. These other goods are thus reflexive in nature, meaning that they
have intelligible value only if, and to the extent that, they are freely chosen by
individual persons.
This article will refer to this caricatured conception as “Untrammeled
Autonomy.” The Untrammeled Autonomy caricature will be used to refer to Justice
Kennedy’s mystery-of-life passage from Casey and any principle that takes personal
autonomy as a conclusive reason for action as against human goods such as life,
marriage, and the other “attributes of personhood.”7 Though there is disagreement
about the implications of Untrammeled Autonomy, the idea expressed in Casey has
found assent among both so-called “conservative”8 and so-called “liberal”9 judges of
both federal10 and state11 judiciaries.
On the other side of the autonomy battle is a view, also caricatured for purposes
of clarity, which perceives little or no value in personal autonomy. According to this
view, the government ought to play a strong role in directing citizens to personal
responsibility. This view is used to support strong government restrictions not only
on assisted suicide and marriage, but also on the consumption of drugs, cigarettes,
and alcohol, and recently on economic activities, such as the decision whether to
purchase health insurance.
Proponents of this conception of personal autonomy sometimes occupy opposite
ends of the political spectrum. At one end, some religious figures can be found
calling for the codification of “Judeo-Christian principles” in positive law in order to
ensure the moral uprightness of citizens.12 At the other end, many of the
justifications for the landmark health care legislation that Congress enacted in 2010,

6

Casey, 505 U.S. at 851.

7

Id.

8

See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 574, for Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion.

9
See Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 79 F.3d 790, 813-14 (9th Cir. 1996);
Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 850 F. Supp. 1454, 1459-61 (W.D. Wash. 1994).
10

See, e.g., Quill v. Vacco, 80 F.3d 716, 730 (2d Cir. 1996), rev’d, 521 U.S. 793 (1997).

11

See, e.g., Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 959 (Mass. 2003).

12

D. JAMES KENNEDY WITH JIM NELSON BLACK, CHARACTER & DESTINY, A NATION IN
SEARCH OF ITS SOUL 33, 243 (1994). Kennedy denied that secular government “can invent
rules and a system of order without regard for God’s perfect law,” and claimed, “Morality is
the only thing you can legislate!” Id. (emphasis original). Far from threatening freedom,
Kennedy believed that his theonomous proposal would promote freedom. Freedom, especially
freedom of thought and expression, comes not from recognizing personal autonomy but rather
from following Christian principles. Id. at 33.
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which includes a mandate that every American purchase health insurance,13 rest on
the principle that the government should direct citizens to take responsible, moral
action to ensure “that everybody should have some basic security when it comes to
their health care.”14 This principle trumps the freedom to choose how to pay for
one’s health care because Americans have a “shared responsibility” to contribute to
health insurance coverage for everyone.15
As in the Untrammeled Autonomy camp, there exist wide divergences of views
among those who believe that the government should coerce its citizens to exercise
personal or collective responsibility. But for simplicity, this article will refer to this
caricatured view of autonomy as “Authoritative Paternalism.”
The combatants in this conflict often move their debate to the national level and
seek to apply their principles to particular, controversial issues in federal law. The
stakes are high in controversial disputes, such as the justness of assisted suicide and
the definition of marriage. Nationalizing these issues raises the stakes even higher.
There remains little room for consensus, much less reasoned understanding, when
these issues are nationalized, as when the United States Supreme Court creates a
constitutional right to perform a controversial action,16 or where Congress and the
President forbid an action (such as marijuana use) the immorality of which is a
matter of some doubt, and which the states might otherwise permit in some
instances.17 Gains for one side must be obtained at the expense of the other, and the
autonomy war becomes a zero-sum conflict.
This warfare over personal autonomy has at times overlooked two important
sources of insight. First, much can be learned about the interaction between personal
autonomy and other human goods in state law. State law contains many insights on
the relationship between autonomy and other goods and it frequently informs federal
courts’ interpretation of ambiguous or contested constitutional provisions. In Justice
Brandeis’s famous word picture, the states are laboratories for policy-making, which
conduct “experimentation in things social and economic.”18 Especially when the
courts consider claims of fundamental rights, they would be better equipped to
address these claims if they understood the contours, forcefulness, and limitations of
13

Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 1501 (codified at 42
U.S.C.A. § 18091 (West 2010)).
14
Remarks by the President and Vice President at Signing of the Health Insurance Reform
Bill, WHITE HOUSE, OFFICE OF THE PRESS SEC’Y (March 23, 2010), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-and-vice-president-signinghealth-insurance-reform-bill.
15
Robert Pear, Obama Open to a Mandate on Health Insurance, N.Y. TIMES, June 3,
2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/04/health/policy/04health.html. This language found
its way into the legislation itself. The heading for the provision of the act that contains the
individual mandate is titled, “Shared Responsibility for Health Care.” OFFICE OF THE LEGIS.
COUNSEL, 111TH CONG., COMPILATION OF PATIENT PROT. AND AFFORDABLE CARE ACT 143
(2010).
16

See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 116 (1973).

17

In Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 15 (2005), the Supreme Court held that the criminal
prohibition in United States federal law against the possession of marijuana preempts more
permissive state laws.
18

New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
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the personal autonomy principle on which they are being asked to rely. Much of this
can be gleaned from studying the laws of the states.
Second, none of the landmark cases, and almost none of the scholarly literature,
consider the value of autonomy in the context of the basic human goods in favor of
which it is exercised. This is a serious deficiency because, as a result, many people
view personal autonomy as binary, either implicated or not in any particular issue.
But by considering the instrumental value of autonomy in its service of extrinsic
ends one realizes that personal autonomy is a multi-faceted good. It is neither
absolutely valuable nor entirely lacking in value. Rather, its value is contingent
upon the uses to which it is put.
This article will begin in Part II with a brief sketch of the recent work that legal
philosophers have done to understand the relationship between personal autonomy
and other human goods. Part III will then proceed to examine what state lawmakers
have said about the question, and what can be learned from their enactments. This
article will only scratch the surface of the insights that state law has to offer about
the relationships between personal autonomy and other human goods. The approach
here is shallow and broad.
In the end, state law teaches six important lessons about the relationship between
personal autonomy and other human goods. These are:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

Personal autonomy is an important condition of pre-moral choosing
among basic human goods.
The state properly restricts exercises of personal autonomy that
cause harm.
Personal autonomy is an important condition of the realization of
reflexive basic goods.
Some autonomous acts are valueless.
Not all basic goods appear to be reflexive.
Neither a principle of personal autonomy nor the unconditional
value of some basic goods conclusively resolves every controversial
issue.
II. PERSONAL AUTONOMY AND BASIC HUMAN GOODS
A. Four Thoughtful Accounts of Autonomy

Many serious jurisprudential scholars have in recent decades turned their
attention to the problem of personal autonomy and the realization of human goods
and have helped to carve a path between Untrammeled Autonomy and Authoritative
Paternalism. This part will consider four of the most thoughtful accounts of personal
autonomy, those of Ronald Dworkin, Joseph Raz, John Finnis, and Robert George.
All four affirm the value of personal autonomy. Dworkin considers autonomy an
essential element of a life lived well.19 Raz considers autonomy a basic human good,
having intrinsic value and thus constituting a reason for choice and action in and of
itself.20 Finnis takes autonomy to be an important precondition to the realization of
certain human goods, such as friendship, practical reasonableness, and religious
19

RONALD DWORKIN, LIFE’S
AND INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM 84-94
20

DOMINION: AN ARGUMENT ABOUT ABORTION, EUTHANASIA,
(1994).

JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 7, 390-395 (1986).
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exercise, which can be realized only if they are freely chosen.21 And George asserts
that the free choice exercised in an autonomous act makes right actions more perfect
than they would be if coerced.22
All four of these thinkers also recognize important limitations upon the reach and
value of personal autonomy. Dworkin recognizes the fundamental conviction that
one cannot make a wrong action right simply by choosing it; “a person’s thinking a
given choice right for him does not make it so.”23 Raz observes that personal
autonomy is subject to the contingencies of “appropriate mental abilities, an
adequate range of options, and independence.”24 And Finnis and George, while
affirming the important instrumental value of personal autonomy, both deny that
autonomy is valuable in and of itself.25
The remainder of this part will bring these four thinkers into dialogue with each
other. The object will be not to resolve any differences among them but rather to use
their points of agreement, and points on which they can be reconciled, to frame the
consideration of state laws’ treatment of autonomy, which follows.
B. A Conversation
Raz provides a helpful definition of personal autonomy. The “ruling idea” is
“that people should make their own lives” by choice.26 Personal autonomy is an
“ideal of self-creation.”27 In embracing goals and commitments and remaining true
to them one “gives shape to one’s life, determines what would count as a successful
life and what would be a failure.”28 Dworkin, Finnis, and George agree with Raz
that people can, to some extent, create their own reasons for action simply by
choosing to do so. As Finnis observes, where one is faced with a choice between
two incompatible but equally-reasonable options, it is the act of choosing itself, the
exercise of free will, which settles the question.29
21
JOHN FINNIS, MORAL ABSOLUTES: TRADITION, REVISION, AND TRUTH 20-24 (1991)
[hereinafter “FINNIS, MORAL ABSOLUTES”]; John Finnis, Liberalism and Natural Law Theory,
45 MERCER L. REV. 687, 694-95 (1994) [hereinafter “Finnis, Liberalism and Natural Law”].
22

ROBERT GEORGE, MAKING MEN MORAL: CIVIL LIBERTIES AND PUBLIC MORALITY 17677 (1993).
23

DWORKIN, supra note 19, at 206.

24

RAZ, supra note 20, at 372.

25

GEORGE, supra note 22, at 175-80; JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS
85-90 (1980) [hereinafter “FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS”]; Finnis, Liberalism
and Natural Law, supra note 21, at 691-92.
26

RAZ, supra note 20, at 369. This is true even for people who deny the value of
autonomy. Id. They, like everyone else, are better off living autonomous lives than nonautonomous lives. Id.
27

Id. at 370.

28

Id. at 387.

29
FINNIS, MORAL ABSOLUTES, supra note 21, at 58. The act of choosing rationally “is
creative of personal character, and thus of a most significant aspect of the reality of each
person who is capable of meaningful relations with other persons.” Id. It demonstrates the
capacity, so unique to human beings, to establish “some meaningful relationship between his
or her feelings, understanding, judgments, and actions.” Id.
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For this reason, a person’s life consists in part of values and reasons of his own
making. But Raz hastens to reject the “exaggerated . . . doctrine of arbitrary selfcreation,” which holds that all value derives from choice which is itself not guided
by value.30 Raz insists, “[a]utonomy requires a choice of goods. A choice between
good and evil is not enough.”31 Likewise, Finnis denies that all reasons for action
are created by choice; some human goods simply are good, apart from free choice.32
And George insists that the “suitability of objects of choice” must be judged “by
reference to standards sufficiently impersonal and objective to be counted as
reasons.”33 Otherwise, actions cannot be chosen for reasons, but only for desires,
appetites, and other sub-rational preferences. Thus these thinkers substantially agree
that personal autonomy is not the most fundamental value. Respect for personal
autonomy entails respect for other equally-fundamental human goods, such as life,
health, and marriage, as well.
To see why this is so, it is important to consider how personal autonomy is
actually exercised. Raz explains that the achievement of autonomy requires not
merely freedom from coercion but also a range of acceptable options from which to
choose.34 “One cannot have an option to be a barrister, a surgeon, or a psychiatrist in
a society where those professions, and the institutions their existence presupposes,
do not exist.”35 Because humans are essentially social creatures, and share common
views about which options are worthwhile, many common goods are, in fact, both
common and intrinsically good.36 Finnis explains that the commonality of goods
does not entail “that the members of a community must all have the same values or
objectives.”37 But there must be “some set (or set of sets) of conditions which needs
to obtain if each of the members is to obtain his own objectives.”38
In other words, the achievement of personal autonomy entails that the individual
is not free to determine the value of all goods. In order to make one’s own reasons
and projects through the exercise of personal autonomy one must respect preexisting, objective reasons not of one’s own making. Some find this insight counterintuitive. But careful consideration reveals considerable merit in it.
So to have acceptable options one must discover other objective goods, which are
at least equally as valuable as autonomy, which one shares in common with other

30

RAZ, supra note 20, at 387-88.

31

Id. at 379.

32

See discussion infra.

33

GEORGE, supra note 22, at 154.

34

RAZ, supra note 20, at 148-57. Raz distinguishes between the capacity to achieve
autonomy and the achievement of autonomy. Id. Autonomy as a capacity requires freedom
from coercion. Autonomy as achievement requires more. Id. at 203-05. The ideal of
autonomy cannot be achieved without “having a sufficient range of acceptable options.” Id. at
205.
35

Id.

36

Id.

37

FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS, supra note 25, at 156.

38

Id.
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people, and which provide reasons to choose them.39 Finnis has helpfully identified
these other goods. They are life (including health), knowledge, play, aesthetic
experience, friendship, practical reasonableness (what some call reasonable action or
morally-upright choosing), and order with ultimate reality (what Finnis “summarily
and lamely,” in his words, called “religion”).40 From these basic goods all other
human goods derive their value.
These basic goods are common in several senses. They are good for all and
known to all.41 That people disagree about what is good does not entail that all
goods are subjective; knowledge, for example, simply is better than ignorance.42
Also, realization of the goods is neither an individual project (as Untrammeled
Autonomy proponents would have it) nor a matter of the collective good of the
greatest number (as many Authoritative Paternalists would portray the matter).
Rather, one participates in goods with others in projects of cooperation and common
commitment.43 Thus, the “common good” is not collective in the utilitarian sense of
the greatest aggregate good for the greatest number,44 which necessarily contradicts
or overrides the goods (and autonomy) of individuals. Rather, the “common good”
39

RAZ, supra note 20, at 205-06.

40

FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS, supra note 25, at 85-90. In a later writing,
Finnis provided a slightly modified list, identifying the basic goods as (1) knowledge; (2)
skillful performance in work and play; (3) bodily life and the components of its fullness, such
as health and safety; (4) friendship and association between persons; (5) conjugal marriage;
(6) practical reasonableness; and (7) “harmony with the widest reaches and most ultimate
source of all reality, including meaning and value.” Finnis, Liberalism and Natural Law,
supra note 21, at 691-92. The point here is not to nail down a precise and comprehensive list
but rather to observe that there are basic goods, that they are at least equally as basic as
personal autonomy.
41

Finnis observes that all human societies show concern for these goods, or some forms or
instantiations of these goods, and the practical principles that guide their realization. FINNIS,
NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS, supra note 25, at 83-84. Though no value is
recognized at all times, in all places, in the same way, anthropologists find with “striking
unanimity” that the basic goods are known to all societies in some way. Id. at 83. The basic
goods are “good for any and every person.” Id. at 155.
42

Finnis observes that, in moving from an inclination toward knowledge to a grasp of its
self-evident value, “[o]ne finds oneself reflecting that ignorance and muddle are to be avoided,
simply as such and not merely in relation to a closed list of questions that one has raised.” Id.
at 61. One recognizes that a “well-informed and clear-headed person” is well-off, not merely
because he can make instrumental use of his knowledge, and profit from it, but it is good for
everyone to know. Id. And this holds not merely for oneself and one’s own interests, “but at
large.” Id.
43
To illustrate, Finnis holds up the basic good of friendship: “For A to be B’s friend, A
must act (at least in substantial part) for the sake of B’s well-being, and must value B’s wellbeing for the sake of B. A must treat B’s well-being as an aspect of his (A’s) own wellbeing.” Id. at 142-43. But the same is also true of B: “It follows that A must value his (A’s)
own well-being for the sake of B, while B must value his (B’s) own well-being for the sake of
A. And so on. The reciprocity of love does not come to rest at either pole.” Id. at 143.
44
Id. at 154. Because the basic goods are incommensurable, this consequentialist
calculation is unworkable, incoherent, and irrational. Id. at 111-18; RAZ, supra note 20, at
321-66.
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refers to “the factor or set of factors . . . which, as considerations in someone’s
practical reasoning, would make sense of or give reason for his collaboration with
others and would likewise, from their point of view, give reason for their
collaboration with each other and with him.”45
But nor is the common good realized merely through individual choice. Indeed,
personal autonomy itself cannot be reconciled with moral individualism. As Raz
observed, the associations and institutions that form around joint participations in the
good are essential predicates of the exercise of personal autonomy because they
make available a range of adequate options in which individuals might choose to
participate.46 For this reason, Raz recognized that moral individualism is
incompatible with personal autonomy.47
All of this causes Ronald Dworkin to feel a tension in moral reasoning. On one
hand, one’s commitment to a particular conception of the good is part of what makes
that commitment valuable for that individual person.48 On the other hand is the
“even more fundamental conviction” that some conceptions of the good are
mistaken, “that a person’s thinking a given choice right for him does not make it
so.”49 Moral reasoning is thus a process of both choice and judgment.50 This tension
between choice and judgment poses for Dworkin a dichotomy. The significant value
of autonomous choice, and the integrity it safeguards, pulls Dworkin toward “the
annihilating idea that critical interests are only subjective, only matters of how we
feel.”51 The belief that some choices are wrong pulls him toward the “equally
unacceptable idea that everyone’s critical interests are the same, over all history, that
there is only one truly best way for anyone to live.”52
Raz and George see a way out of this conundrum. One can affirm the basic,
unconditional value of some human goods without insisting on only one truly best
way to live. Raz and George both recognize “many forms of the good which are
admitted to be so many valuable expressions of people’s nature,” while also
affirming “that certain conceptions of the good are worthless and demeaning, and
that political action may and should be taken to eradicate or at least curtail them.”53
45

FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS, supra note 25, at 154.

46

RAZ, supra note 20, at 206.

47

Id.

48

DWORKIN, supra note 19, at 206.

49

Id.

50

Id.

51

Id.

52

Id.

53

GEORGE, supra note 22, at 164 n.7 (quoting RAZ, supra note 20, at 133).
To see why this is so, take a couple of easy cases. A person might choose
not to get married in order to pursue a life of religious instruction and charitable
work. This person has reasonably chosen to pursue the human goods of
religious exercise and charity over the human good of marriage. But this
choice does not entail denigrating the value of marriage, or insisting that
celibacy is the only way to live. It merely reflects the reality that one must
choose between mutually-inconsistent ends. Similarly, one who chooses to
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For this reason, personal autonomy and the other human goods need not conflict
with each other. The question is not, as proponents of Untrammeled Autonomy
would have it, whether the state should leave people free to make autonomous
choices. Nor is the question, as proponents of Authoritative Paternalism would pose
it, how much freedom citizens should have to act irresponsibly. Rather, the question
for lawmakers is which autonomous choices realize real human goods, and therefore
ought to be left as matters of personal choice, and which harm the good, and can
rightly be disincentivized or even prohibited. That question is not an easy question
to answer. But the judgments of state lawmakers on that question reveal some
helpful insights.
III. LESSONS FROM STATE LAW
Because state lawmakers frequently must make judgments about which ends are
worth realizing through coercive means, it is possible to inquire more closely about
the value and limits of autonomy by looking at state law. This article now turns to
examine a few, discrete areas of state law where autonomy plays a role, or is thought
to play a role, in determining which of two (or more) policies the state should
pursue.
Admittedly, state lawmakers are not always, or perhaps even often, clear about
what value they attribute to personal autonomy and other goods. But their
deliberations and decisions reflect definite commitments on this subject. Those
commitments are entitled to examination not because they are necessarily correct but
because they provide useful starting points from which to explore the extent of
respect state law can and should afford to personal autonomy. Examining state law
with a critical eye reveals some helpful lessons about the value of autonomy because
the judgments of state lawmakers have real-world consequences, and these can be
studied.
Thus, the goal here is not to derive normative judgments from what state law
currently is or from what state lawmakers have done. Indeed, some state laws are
bad laws precisely because they are predicated on wrong views about autonomy.
Rather, the goal is to determine what sort of reason for action autonomy turns out to
be after it has been tested in the laboratory of democracy.
A. Property Owner Sovereignty
Lesson One: Personal Autonomy Is an Important Condition of Pre-Moral
Choosing Among Human Goods

pursue a career in music over a career in scientific research has not judged the
good of aesthetic experience to be objectively superior to the human good of
knowledge, or that a career in music is the only sensible career for everyone.
At the same time, some choices are simply worthless, and therefore
unreasonable. The deliberate destruction of a basic good, such as life, has no
intelligible value. Murder is therefore wrong, and is a fundamentally different
choice than the decision not to conceive a child in the first instance. Similarly,
to choose a career in music over a career in scientific inquiry is not the same as
obscuring scientific knowledge by, for example, falsifying the data from one’s
research. Destroying a basic good is not the same as not choosing to instantiate
it in the first place.

https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol59/iss4/6

10

2011] THE MYSTERY OF LIFE IN THE LABORATORY OF DEMOCRACY 599
The control and freedom that make personal autonomy possible are on vivid
display in the sovereignty that a property owner exercises over his assets. State law
accords striking respect to the owner of private property, and strongly protects the
rights that enable him to control his asset, particularly his right to exclude others
from it. Civil and criminal trespass laws carve out, for the property owner, a space
of dominion, within which he is free to use his asset for his own personal ends
within the limitations discussed in the next part.
1. The Right to Exclude
The right to exclude has clear boundaries and sharp edges. Thus, the “midnight
streaker who dashes unseen across the lawn of another, and who merely bends a few
blades of grass in the process, is guilty of the tort of trespass.”54 One trespass case in
particular reveals the impregnability of property owner sovereignty. In Jacque v.
Steenberg Homes, Inc.,55 the Wisconsin Supreme Court upheld a $100,000 punitive
damages award for a trespass that resulted in no actual damages. The Jacques forbad
Steenberg Homes, a mobile home sale company, to cut a path across their frozen,
snow-covered field to a neighbor’s tract.56 The only alternative course contained a
sharp curve, was covered in seven feet of snow, and would require extra equipment
to navigate.57 Because delivery was included in the sale price of the mobile home,58
Steenberg Homes had a strong financial incentive to use the easier route over the
Jacques’s land. But the Jacques wrongly believed that permitting Steenberg Homes
to make the delivery over their land would give rise to an adverse possession claim
against them59 and they remained steadfast in their refusal, despite repeated
requests.60
Steenberg Homes delivered the mobile home over the Jacques’s property without
permission.61 In the ensuing trespass action a jury awarded the Jacques $1 in
nominal damages and $100,000 in punitive damages.62 In upholding the award, the
Wisconsin Supreme Court affirmed the individual property owner’s “strong interest
in excluding trespassers.”63 But the court went further and asserted that “[s]ociety
has an interest in punishing and deterring intentional trespassers beyond that of
protecting the interests of the individual landowner.”64 This drastic remedy was

54

Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, The Morality of Property, 48 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 1849, 1871 (2007).
55

Jacque v. Steenberg Homes, Inc., 563 N.W.2d 154 (Wis. 1997).

56

Id. at 157.

57

Id.

58

Id. at 156.

59

Id. at 157.

60

Id.

61

Id.
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Id. at 158.

63

Id. at 160.

64

Id.
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necessary to preserve the “integrity of the legal system”65 and to vindicate the public
expectation that wrongdoers should be “appropriately punished.”66
Commenting on this decision, Thomas Merrill and Henry Smith have noted the
strikingly moral tone of the court’s reasoning. The court treated the Jacques’s right
to exclude as a moral right, and allowed punitive damages to vindicate this right,
“not to promote public utility by preventing violence or protecting privacy.”67 In
other words, this is not a case about the collective good of the greatest number.
Rather, the case illustrates the “moral side of property law.”68
2. Owner Sovereignty, Autonomy, and Basic Goods
Why does state law provide such rigorous protection to the owner-sovereign?
And why would a state high court use such strong moral language in defense of this
protection? A clue can be found in the purposes for which property owners exercise
their property rights. The point of private property is to serve human goods, such as
life, health, personal autonomy, and practical reasonableness, the very goods that
Finnis identified as those necessary for the exercise of personal autonomy.69 A
person who exercises sovereignty over her assets does not always realize these
goods, but has the resources necessary to do so. And whatever other values it may
serve in particular cases, sovereignty over one’s property entails free choice, an
essential precondition to both autonomy and practical reasonableness.70 Thus
property serves both personal autonomy and other human goods.

65

Id.

66

Id. at 161.

67

Merrill & Smith, supra note 54, at 1873.

68

Id. at 1870, 1874.

69

See FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS, supra note 25, at 165-73.

70

See GEORGE, supra note 22, at 168, 177-78. One can affirm this role for autonomy
whether one takes autonomy to be a basic good or merely an instrumental good. Raz and
Finnis both understand autonomous choice to operate in this way. Both affirm that a choice
between basic goods is a choice between incommensurables, and is thus undetermined by
reason, and that the act of choosing itself both settles the underdetermined question and
creates a new reason for action. RAZ, supra note 20, at 388-89; FINNIS, MORAL ABSOLUTES,
supra note 21, at 58.
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Property owners choose to purchase, use, encumber,71 and alienate their property
rights (or not72) in order to realize certain ends, such as a more aesthetically-pleasing
kitchen, an extra bedroom to accommodate new additions to the family, or the
investment value of home ownership. The value of these ends is generally derived
from more basic goods, such as beauty, health, and life. For example, the addition of
an extra bedroom can be instrumentally valuable for its enabling the more
fundamental end, the addition of a new child to the family, which is an instance of
the basic human good of life.
Property owner sovereignty is therefore consistent with George’s account of
autonomy as instrumentally valuable. The autonomy carved out within the
sovereign owner’s property interest enables the owner to realize human goods other
than autonomy, and to make pre-moral choices among mutually-exclusive
possibilities. But owner sovereignty is also consistent with Raz’s concept of
autonomy-as-achievement. Just as the achievement of autonomy requires the
availability of acceptable options, it requires the availability of sufficient resources
to attain those options.
71
It is important to note that the freedom to use one’s property in order to incur an
obligation serves, rather than limits, personal autonomy. Property owners, like all persons,
create moral reasons when they choose to oblige themselves. Binding obligation is itself a
reason for action, in part because people choose to accept obligations for intelligible reasons.
A lessor, for example, promises to honor and to protect the lessee’s quiet use and enjoyment
in order to gain something that he could not have obtained otherwise. Or consider the
decision to incur a mortgage obligation in order to purchase a home. When one chooses to
own (rather than rent) one’s home, one accepts the obligations associated with the loan as the
end product of deliberative choice about one’s personal priorities and commitments in light of
certain, fixed facts.

Just as particular obligations follow from autonomous reflection on the good ends one
has chosen to pursue, obligation generally is the conclusion at the end of a chain of inferences
derived from the common good. See FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS, supra
note 25, at 302. Obligation is a means of cooperation, which enhances both collective
productivity and individual autonomy. Id. at 303.
Like the law, [the institution of obligation] enables past, present, and predictable
future to be related in a stable though developing order; enables this order to be
effected in complex interpersonal patterns; and brings all this within reach of
individual initiative and arrangement, thus enhancing individual autonomy in the
very process of increasing individuals’ obligations.
Id. Indeed, the point of the institution of binding obligation is to enable individuals to
exercise control over their relationships within a community. Id. at 308.
72
Owner sovereignty must protect both the right of the owner to take action and the right
not to take action. Even the non-use of an asset can promote the good, as where a farmer
allows his fields to lie fallow for a year so that they can recover. The replenished fields
produce higher yields in subsequent years, serving the goods of life and health. The point of
this central aspect of property is to give the owner freedom to choose. And this freedom to
choose enables the owner to realize real human goods.

It bears repeating here that, if Raz, Finnis, and George are correct, these goods are
common. So, for example, a community celebrates the birth of a new human because that
child’s life will accrue to the good of all with whom she is in community. And the crops
produced by the sabbatical farmer are a form of wealth that benefits both the farmer and those
who purchase and consume the crops.
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Benjamin Barros, in exploring what he calls the “institutional relationship”
between property and freedom, observes that property gives people access to the
resources that they need in order to be free.73 By carving out a zone where the state
or community must justify interference with the owner’s sovereignty, property
promotes the “ability of individuals to make basic life choices for themselves.”74
But it also does more than this. Freedom would be “an empty concept if a person
does not have the resources to act (or refrain from acting) consistent with that
freedom.”75 Property enables access to those resources, and frees property owners
from being “beholden to others.”76
Indeed, the freedom that owner sovereignty enables can be understood to
promote autonomy, just as it promotes the other goods that the property owner
chooses. Free choices among possible instantiations of basic goods are pre-moral,
meaning that they do not implicate moral principles or rules. They are, in the
language of moral philosophy, rationally undetermined. One can just as reasonably
choose to devote one’s assets and resources to being more hospitable as to producing
crops. The choice to be a farmer instead of a host, or a host instead of a farmer, is
therefore autonomously made. It is the act of choosing, in itself, that creates new
reasons for one’s future choosing. In the realm of pre-moral choosing among
possible instantiations of the good one really does make one’s own life.
Assets enable people to make their own lives by creating new reasons for their
future actions. People deliberate about how to use their assets because there are
almost always countervailing options and considerations. Choosing one end often
entails foregoing the pursuit of alternatives, so the pre-moral good chosen must be
chosen over other, alternative ends. A pre-moral choice between basic goods is a
choice between incommensurables, and is thus undetermined by reason.77 And even
when the choice is between instrumental goods, which sometimes can be measured
against each other such that the choice is not fully undetermined, there generally
remains more than one reasonable option. Moral principles will not often resolve the
choice. Moral side constraints seldom govern the questions whether a person should
73

D. Benjamin Barros, Property and Freedom, 4 NYU J. L. & LIBERTY 36, 51-57 (2009).

74

Id. at 47. Barros does not explore the implications of his theory for communal property
owners, such as civic organizations, religious assemblies, corporations, and charitable groups.
But owner sovereignty would seem to promote the freedom and autonomy of groups just as it
promotes the freedom and autonomy of individuals. The local Rotary Club, for example,
would cease to be distinctive as a particular type of social organization, and to determine its
own projects, if it were not free to exclude non-members from the facilities where it
assembles.
75

Id. at 51.

76

Id. Barros observes that any non-private (he uses the common term “communal”)
system of property must use some method of resource allocation, which deprives individuals
of the freedom “to make decisions of their own on how to pursue their needs and desires.” Id.
at 52. And the one charged with allocating resources could use distribution as means of
rewarding allies and punishing critics, thus depriving people of political freedom. Id.
Granting equal rights to resources would not solve this problem. “For example, if person A
values housing more than education, and person B values education more than housing, then
equal allocations prevent both A and B from making resource choices needed to enable them
to choose for themselves how to live their lives.” Id. at 53.
77

RAZ, supra note 20, at 388-89; FINNIS, MORAL ABSOLUTES, supra note 21, at 58.
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rent or own a home, or remodel a kitchen or make do with the old one. Rather, the
person enjoys a great deal of freedom to choose.
Where in such cases the choice between incompatible options is not settled by
the superiority of one option over the other, or by physical, psychological, or
economic limitations, or by legal or moral restrictions, it is the act of choosing itself,
the exercise of free will, autonomously exercised, which settles the question.78 The
person making the choice is in an important sense the maker or creator of the state of
affairs that follows the choice: the education of the child; the new, more hospitable
kitchen.
Property promotes pluralism. Indeed, property is the paradigmatic pluralist
institution. Just as one person’s notion of the good life differs from his neighbor’s,
one person’s use of his assets to pursue the good life differs from his neighbor’s.
But in order to work effectively, property owner sovereignty must free the property
owner to pursue projects that others do not value. It must honor and protect the
freedom of the owner sovereign to choose between, for example, producing more
food and hosting more guests.
This is why both purely economic theories of property and theories of state
governance of property are incomplete. Property serves more than merely economic
values, and thus secures the right of the owner sovereign to pursue non-economic
ends, even when that pursuit is not in her economic best interest. It also enables
property owners to pursue goals that the state does not value.
The basic goods are all truly basic and thus incommensurable; they are all
equally fundamental reasons for action and cannot be compared with each other.
Because the basic goods are incommensurable, and thus cannot be rationally
measured on any single criteria, it is the property owner’s choice that determines
which goods will predominate over others. Sometimes this choice will not make
sense to an economist, or to a neighbor who sees property only in economic terms.
And the choice will often look odd to government bureaucrats.
So, in a famous case the Connecticut Supreme Court vindicated the right of
Helen Vealencis, a co-tenant in a tenancy in common, to force a partition of the
tenancy in kind and to prevent a partition by sale.79 The court faulted the trial court,
which had ordered a partition by sale, for, inter alia, looking only to economic
considerations.80 The trial court “failed to give due consideration” to Ms. Vealencis’
actual and exclusive possession of part of the land, and to the facts that she had made
her home there and derived her livelihood from her operation of a family business
there.81 The state high court set the judgment aside and ordered a remand so that the
trial court could consider all of Vealencis’ reasons for wanting to stay on the
property.82

78

FINNIS, MORAL ABSOLUTES, supra note 21, at 58.

79

Delfino v. Vealencis, 436 A.2d 27, 33 (Conn. 1980).

80

Id.

81

Id.

82

Id.
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On remand the trial court permitted Ms. Vealencis to remain on the property and
honored Vealencis’ request for a partition in kind.83 Her decision caused her to
suffer a significant financial loss. Her two co-tenants developed and sold their
allotment for $725,000; the partitioned tract that Vealencis retained was worth only
$72,000.84 It was in the best financial interest of the parties to sell the entire property
for residential development and divide up the proceeds. But the value that Vealencis
placed in the land could not be measured in money, and the law honors that value.
Other doctrines also secure the right of the owner sovereign to choose for noneconomic reasons. For example, the doctrine of ameliorative waste authorizes the
owner of a future interest in property to prevent the possessory estate holder from
improving the asset and increasing its economic value without the future interest
holder’s consent where the improvement would permanently injure the sentimental
or aesthetic value of the asset. In a paradigmatic case, George Brokaw held a life
tenancy in a mansion at the corner of 79th Street and Fifth Avenue in New York
City.85 Operating and maintaining the mansion cost many thousands of dollars
annually, and there was no rental market for the residence, so to preserve the
mansion entailed significant financial loss.86 Brokaw proposed replacing the
mansion with an apartment building.87 There existed significant demand for
apartments, and the proposed building would, he estimated, net a $30,000 profit.88
Nevertheless, the court sided with the future interest holders, who objected to the
proposed demolition of the mansion. The act of changing the estate would be a
waste, even if it resulted in economic improvement.89 The court explained,
The receipt by [the remaindermen] at the end of the life estate of a 13story $900,000 apartment house might be more beneficial to them.
Financially, the objecting adults may be unwise in not consenting to the
proposed change. They may be selfish and unmindful that in the normal
course of time and events they probably will not receive the fee. With
motives and purposes the court is not concerned.90
These and other doctrines must genuinely baffle anyone who attempts to
understand property using a single scale of values. Indeed, any attempt to impose
any single value system, whether economic or otherwise, upon property owners must
result in hopeless confusion about property law. But property law makes a lot of
sense if the institution of property is viewed as a pluralist institution, one that honors
and protects the rights of owner sovereigns to pursue incommensurable values in the
exercise of their personal autonomy. The law leaves property owners free to make
83
THOMAS W. MERRILL & HENRY SMITH, PROPERTY: PRINCIPLES
(2007).
84

Id.

85

Brokaw v. Fairchild, 237 N.Y.S. 6 (Sup. Ct. 1929).
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Id. at 10.
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Id. at 10-11.
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Id.
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Id. at 14-15.
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Id. at 15.
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their own determinations about what they value and how they will use property in
pursuit of their own values. And this is true even if the choices of property owners
seem odd or unwise to an outside observer.
3. In Service to Human Dignity
Why should we care whether property owners have the freedom to choose to use
their assets to make new reasons for themselves? Freedom to choose for intelligible
reasons, and thus to bring a new reality into being, is an essential component of
human dignity; it is a central capacity that sets human beings apart from other
beings. Finnis has observed that the act of choosing rationally “is creative of
personal character, and thus of a most significant aspect of the reality of each person
who is capable of meaningful relations with other persons.”91 It demonstrates the
capacity to establish “some meaningful relationship between his or her feelings,
understanding, judgments, and actions.”92 Property owner sovereignty enables the
exercise of this capacity.93
Because choices about how to use property are generally pre-moral they
epitomize the exercise of free choice in its highest and best form. One might
encumber one’s house with a second mortgage in order to remodel one’s kitchen and
host more dinner parties. Or one might assume the same mortgage obligation in
order to further one’s education. One can just as reasonably choose to devote one’s
assets to being more hospitable as to acquiring knowledge. Given finite value in the
house one cannot choose both. But neither is per se unreasonable or immoral. In
such cases, which comprise the overwhelming majority of choices about property
use, it is the act of choosing that creates a new state of affairs.
By using property to choose between equally-reasonable options, a property
owner in an important sense makes her own life. She exercises free choice to bring
about a new state of affairs. This is distinctly human achievement. The practice of
choosing freely for intelligible reasons, and by choice bringing a new reality and
new reasons into being, is an essential component of human dignity. Strong
property protection secures the freedom to exercise free choice.
A helpful lesson about the importance of property owner sovereignty to free
choice and human dignity is found in the abolition of common law coverture.94 That
91

FINNIS, MORAL ABSOLUTES, supra note 21, at 58.

92

Id.

93

The view of property that I am sketching here should not be confused with Margaret
Jane Radin’s famous concept of property that is bound up with the holder. See Margaret Jane
Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957 (1982). For a more sophisticated
account of Radin’s theory, see Jeffrey D. Jones, Property and Personhood Revisited, 1 WAKE
FOREST J. L. & POL’Y (2011). The concept of personhood defended here is at odds with
Radin’s (and Jones’), as is more plain in Part III.D, infra.
94

At English and early American common law a woman’s property rights and interests
were merged into those of her husband at her marriage under the doctrine of coverture. 1
WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *442-45; 2 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON
AMERICAN LAW 109 (New York, O. Halsted 1827). A married woman, a “feme covert” as she
was called, could not own property in her individual capacity in any meaningful sense.
Though property law technically permitted her to hold title to assets, she could not exercise
any of the powers of ownership. JESSE DUKEMINIER ET AL., PROPERTY 312 (6th ed. 2006).
For the purposes of property law, the married woman’s identity was subsumed within the
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the common law doctrine of coverture denied to married women the opportunity to
manage their own assets is the reason why that doctrine was unjust. It was not
merely a question of coverture treating men and women differently but also a matter
of denigrating the character and personal autonomy, and thus the dignity, of married
women.
Around the time of the Married Women’s Property Acts,95 the Texas Supreme
Court observed that coverture deemed the married woman, as a result of her
marriage, “divested of her faculties as a rational being.”96 Coverture extinguished
the married woman’s separate existence on the ground that “her reason, faculties,
and intelligence are entombed.”97 By this process of entombment, the woman’s
dignity before the law diminished “to her own detriment and the injury of others,”98
who could not hold her responsible. Meanwhile, her husband enjoyed the
corresponding increase in dignity and sovereignty over their joint affairs.99
When the states abolished coverture, the married woman’s “capacities, reason,
and moral being were likewise resuscitated.”100 By freeing the married woman to
exercise sovereignty over her assets, the law treated her as a fully reasonable and
responsible moral agent, capable of exercising the “right of disposition, control, and
management.”101 She obtained “distinct and independent rights,” which she had the
separate responsibility to prosecute and defend in courts of justice.102 She was free
to choose, and she was expected to accept the consequences of her choices, for good
or ill; the law now respected her “faculties and powers as a moral agent” in relation
to her property.103
As the Texas court recognized, owner sovereignty serves the achievement of
honoring one’s commitments to oneself and to others. It enables the owner
sovereign through the exercise of personal autonomy to make pre-moral choices,
which then become binding reasons for her. In short, it empowers her to exercise her
faculties of human agency, her reason. And because property respects her choices as
rational, it respects her as a person.

identity of her husband. Id. Indeed, a woman’s legal identity merged into her husband’s
identity in several important respects. Melissa Murray, Strange Bedfellows: Criminal Law,
Family Law, and the Legal Construction of Intimate Life, 94 IOWA L. REV. 1253, 1260-62 &
n.24 (2009).
95
See generally Richard H. Chused, Married Women’s Property Law: 1800-1850, 71
GEO. L.J. 1359, 1361 (1983).
96

Jones v. Taylor, 7 Tex. 240, 246 (1851).
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4. Recent Criticisms of Owner Sovereignty
A group of influential scholars has recently called into question the prudence and
justness of owner sovereignty. These scholars would, inter alia, redistribute
property entitlements in favor of collective decision-makers and the poor on the
basis of various moral principles, including a “social-obligation norm.”104 They
doubt that landowners are likely to use their land more wisely than state actors, and
they generally favor a stronger role for law, and a weaker role for sovereign owners,
in the use and disposition of property.105
Their “Statement of Progressive Property”106 has ignited a controversy over the
autonomy that property owners currently enjoy, which is to use and dispose of their
own assets.107 A full discussion of that controversy is beyond the scope of this
article. But two observations are in order. First, it is instructive to note that the
parties on both sides of the controversy largely agree that the purpose of property is
to serve basic, incommensurable goods, and that whoever has the authority to govern
property ought to exercise that authority to promote those goods.108 Being in favor
of virtue and human flourishing does not entail being opposed to strong private
property protections.
Second, there is a real controversy. It is not at all clear that the authors of the
Progressive Statement have successfully cast doubt upon the wisdom of owner
sovereignty. Their position is consistent with Authoritative Paternalism, which
cannot tolerate the strong protections that state property law affords to the owner
sovereign. But it is far from clear that property owners are in general incapable of
exercising their sovereignty for good.
Indeed, Henry Smith criticizes the Progressive Statement authors for their
insufficient attention to the means by which their proposal is supposed to serve the
basic goods on which everyone agrees. The problem in Smith’s view is not that
private property fails to promote human flourishing (it does not fail) but rather that
the critics of owner sovereignty are impatient with the “mysterious way” in which
property serves human goods.109 That everyone favors human flourishing (and its
104

Gregory S. Alexander, The Social-Obligation Norm in American Property Law, 94
CORNELL L. REV. 745 (2009).
105

Eduardo M. Peňalver, Land Virtues, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 821 (2009).

106

Gregory S. Alexander, Eduardo M. Peňalver, Joseph William Singer & Laura S.
Underkuffler, A Statement of Progressive Property, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 743 (2009).
107

See, e.g., Alexander, supra note 104; Gregory S. Alexander, The Complex Core of
Property, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 1063 (2009); Eric R. Claeys, Virtue and Rights in American
Property Law, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 889 (2009); Peňalver, supra note 105; Jedediah Purdy, A
Few Questions About the Social-Obligation Norm, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 949 (2009); Joseph
William Singer, Democratic Estates: Property Law in a Free and Democratic Society, 94
CORNELL L. REV. 1009 (2009); Henry E. Smith, Mind the Gap: The Indirect Relation Between
Ends and Means in American Property Law, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 959 (2009); Katrina M.
Wyman, Should Property Scholars Drop Economics For Virtue? A Skeptical Comment, 94
CORNELL L. REV. 991 (2009).
108

Alexander et al., supra note 106, at 743-44; Peňalver, supra note 105, at 864-86; Smith,
supra note 107, at 959-63.
109

Smith, supra note 107 at 959.
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constituent goods) does not entail that redistribution of property entitlements is the
best means to achieve it, a case that the authors of the Progressive Statement must
make for their argument to succeed, but have not made.110
B. Land Use Regulation
Lesson Two: The State Properly Restricts Exercises of Personal Autonomy That
Cause Harm
States do not permit property owners to exercise unfettered autonomy in the use
and disposition of their assets. As property professors hasten to point out, the maxim
sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas111 does not by itself resolve very many property
disputes, but it is a guiding principle in property law. If it means anything, it must
mean that owner sovereignty does not entitle a property owner to destroy common
human goods. So, for example, the famous case of Katko v. Briney112 stands for the
proposition that one cannot lawfully mount a spring-loaded shotgun in one’s
unoccupied building to harm trespassers who intrude during one’s absence. One
cannot be permitted to destroy another’s life or health, even in defense of one’s
property.
In a foil to Wisconsin’s decision in Jacque, the New Jersey Supreme Court in
State v. Shack113 declined to enforce a criminal trespass provision against two men,
Tejeras and Shack, who entered a farm without the farmer’s permission for the
purpose of providing medical and legal services to migrant workers who were
residing there.114 The text of the statute clearly prohibited any trespass by one who
was forbidden to enter by the owner of the land.115 It did not foreclose the argument
that Tejeras and Shack might be considered invitees of the migrant workers, and
therefore not trespassers.
The case could have been disposed of rather
uncontroversially on that ground. But rather than take that obvious way out, the
court drilled all the way down to first principles and built an argument against
impregnable owner sovereignty.
The court began its analysis with the declamation, “Property rights serve human
values.”116 This fact the court considered both the source of, and a limitation upon,
property rights themselves. The court stated, “[a] man’s right in his real property of
course is not absolute.”117 The maxim that one should use his property so as not to
injure others expresses the “inevitable proposition that rights are relative and there

110

Id. at 959-63.

111

Use your own property so as not to injure your neighbors. State v. Shack, 277 A.2d
369, 373 (N.J. 1971).
112

Katko v. Briney, 183 N.W.2d 657 (Iowa 1971).

113

Shack, 277 A.2d 369.

114

Id. at 370.

115

Id.

116

Id. at 372.

117

Id. at 373.
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must be an accommodation when they meet.”118 The court ruled that there had been
no trespass because, the farmer’s owner sovereignty did all of the accommodating.
The court did not clearly indicate what it meant by its reference to human values.
But one can speculate based upon the facts of the case. That Tejeras and Shack
entered the farm to provide medical and legal services suggests that they intended to
serve the health of the migrant workers there, and to protect their rights. Health is of
course an aspect of the basic good of life. Justice is entailed in the requirements of
practical reasonableness.119 Owner sovereignty therefore gives way when it is used
to threaten human goods.
This principle appears throughout property law, particularly the law of land use.
State laws contain and authorize numerous types of restrictions and controls on
owner sovereignty. But perhaps the most dramatic is the zoning ordinance. Zoning
ordinances anticipate property disputes ex ante, and coercively regulate and restrict
many aspects of land use for the purpose of coordinating the action of landowners.
Indeed, zoning ordinances attempt to forfend some actions that are unlikely even to
give rise to private disputes, such as the aesthetic appearance of structures and
energy conservation.120

118

Id.

119

FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS, supra note 25, at chs. 7 & 8.

120

See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 30-28-111(1), -115(1) (West 2011):
The county planning commission of any county may, and upon order by the board
of county commissioners in any county having a county planning commission shall,
make a zoning plan for zoning all or any part of the unincorporated territory within
such county . . . . Such regulations shall be designed and enacted for the purpose of
promoting the health, safety, morals, convenience, order, prosperity, or welfare of
the present and future inhabitants of the state, including lessening the congestion in
the streets or roads or reducing the waste of excessive amounts of roads, promoting
energy conservation, securing safety from fire, floodwaters, and other dangers,
providing adequate light and air, classifying land uses and distributing land
development and utilization, protecting the tax base, securing economy in
governmental expenditures, fostering the state's agricultural and other industries,
and protecting both urban and non-urban development.
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Every state authorizes its municipalities to enact zoning ordinances.121 Following
the now-canonical formulation from Village of Euclid, Ohio v. Ambler Realty
Company,122 state zoning enabling statutes generally authorize land use regulations
to promote the public health, safety, and general welfare123 and, in many states,
morals.124 These state interests are understood to be non-arbitrary, so they must have
some foundation in rational values. It is beyond the province of this article to
explore what the connection might be.125 It is sufficient to note that property uses
121
ALA. CODE §§ 11-52-70, -72 (2011); ALASKA STAT. §§ 29.40.030, .040 (2011); ARIZ.
REV. STAT. § 9-462.01 (2011); ARK. CODE ANN. § 14-56-403 (2010); CAL. GOV’T CODE §
65850 (West 2011); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 30-28-111(1), -115 (2010); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 8-2
(2010); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 22, § 301 (2010); FLA. STAT. § 163.3161 (2011); GA. CODE ANN.
§§ 36-66-2, -5 (2011); HAW. REV. STAT. § 46-4(A)(5), (6) (2011); IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 676502, -6511 (2011); 65 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11-13-1; IND. CODE § 36-7-4-601 (2011); IOWA
CODE § 414.1(1) (2010); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 12-741(a) (2009); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §
100.201(2) (West 2010); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33:4721 (2011); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 30, § 4352
(2011); MD. CODE ANN. art. 23A, §§ 2(a), (b)(36)(i)-(ii) (2011); MASS. GEN. LAWS Ch. 40A, § 5
(2010); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 125.3201 (2011); MINN. STAT. § 462.357 (2010); MISS. CODE
ANN. § 17-1-3(1) (2010); MO. REV. STAT. § 65.662 (2011); MONT. CODE ANN. § 76-2-301
(2010); NEB. REV. STAT. § 14-401 (2010); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 278.020(1) (West 2010);
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 674:16(i) (2010); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 40:55D-2, -62 (2011); N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 3-21-1(A) (2010); N.Y. GEN. CITY LAW § 20(25) (McKinney 2011); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 160A-381 (2010); N.D. CENT. CODE § 40-47-01 (2011); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
519.02 (West 2011); OKLA. STAT. tit. 11, § 43-101 (2010); OR. REV. STAT. § 227.090 (2009);
16 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5220, 5226 (2010); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 45-24-30(1) (2011); S.C. CODE
ANN. §§ 6-29-710(A), -720 (2010); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 11-2-13 (2010); TENN. CODE ANN. §
13-7-201 (2010); TEX. LOC. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 211.001, 211.003 (West 2010); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 10-9a-102(1), -501 (2011); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 24 § 4302 (2011); VA. CODE ANN. §§
15.2-2280, -2283 (2011); WASH. REV. CODE § 35.63.080 (2011); W. VA. CODE §§ 8A-7-1, 8A3-1 (2011); WIS. STAT. § 59.69 (2010); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 15-1-601 (2011).
122

Vill. of Euclid Ohio v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926).

123

See, e.g., N.Y. GEN. CITY LAW § 20(25) (McKinney 2011):

Subject to the constitution and general laws of this state, every city is empowered . .
. To regulate and restrict the location of trades and industries and the location of
buildings, designed for specified uses, and for said purposes to divide the city into
districts and to prescribe for each such district the trades and industries that shall be
excluded or subjected to special regulation and the uses for which buildings may not
be erected or altered. Such regulations shall be designed to promote the public
health, safety and general welfare and shall be made with reasonable consideration,
among other things, to the character of the district, its peculiar suitability for
particular uses, the conservation of property values and the direction of building
development, in accord with a well considered plan.
124

See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 22, § 301 (2010):

For the purpose of promoting health, safety, morals or the general welfare of the
community, the legislative body of cities and incorporated towns may regulate and
restrict the height, number of stories and size of buildings and other structures,
percentage of lot that may be occupied, the size of yards, courts and other open
spaces, the density of population, and the location and use of buildings, structures
and land for trade, industry, residence or other purposes.
125
It seems plausible to suggest that many of these state interests correspond to the most
basic goods of a community and its members, such as life and health. This idea makes it
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often implicate states’ interests, that those state interests are understood to protect or
promote intelligible goods, and that the state has the authority to restrict property
owner sovereignty in order to promote or protect those goods.
That the ubiquitous use of zoning ordinances is uncontroversial suggests
widespread agreement that property owners should not be permitted to use their
assets in such a way as to jeopardize or harm certain community interests. And one
would expect this limitation on autonomy to be uncontroversial because it is
consistent with all of the reasoned, defensible accounts of autonomy described in
Part II. Notably, that this limitation is uncontroversial suggests that Untrammeled
Autonomy is untenable. If the basic goods are in fact common goods, and not
merely individual goods, then exercising untrammeled autonomy is bound to harm
someone and undermine that person’s own autonomy.
C. Charitable Tax Deductions
Lesson Three: Personal Autonomy Is an Important Condition of the Realization
of Reflexive Basic Goods
That the best discussions of the moral value of choice and autonomy address
taxation policy is no accident.126 Taxation is an exercise of coercion that every
citizen experiences and it presents a challenge to the idea that autonomy has value.
That challenge is answerable,127 but this is not the place to explore the answers.
Rather, one specific tax policy raises a particularly relevant concern. Many states,
following the United States government, allow taxpayers to deduct from their
reported income donations that they have made to a charity.128 The charity deduction
might appear to run contrary to the lesson gleaned in the previous section. If states
rightly act to protect and promote good ends by coercive means, why do states not
simply confiscate those funds that taxpayers are currently donating to charity and
direct them instead to the needs that the state has identified?
possible to speculate about the rational foundations of other aspects of land use law,
particularly the law concerning judicial review of land use decisions. For example, one might
observe that the most fundamental and significant interests on the basis of which
municipalities often regulate land use are interests in the preservation and protection of basic
human goods, such as health and life. One might then infer that those interests that qualify as
compelling are those that directly implicate basic goods. For a very cursory exploration of
this idea, see Adam J. MacLeod, A Non-Fatal Collision: Interpreting RLUIPA Where
Religious Land Uses and Community Interests Meet, 42 URB. LAW. 41, 81-88 (2010).
126

See OLREE, supra note 5, at 30, 211-14; RAZ, supra note 20, at 416.

127

Olree claims that people of good conscience, especially Christians, have a duty to pay
their taxes, which does not correspond to duties to perform other acts that the government
might coerce. OLREE, supra note 5, at 77-80, 212. Raz locates the obligation to pay taxes
within the value of autonomy itself.
[I]f the government has a duty to promote the autonomy of people the harm
principle allows it to use coercion both in order to stop people from actions which
would diminish people’s autonomy and in order to force them to take actions which
are required to improve peoples’ options and opportunities.
RAZ, supra note 20, at 416.
128

See, e.g., ALA. CODE §40-18-15(a)(10) (2011).
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One possible explanation is economic. Perhaps private charitable conduct is
more efficient at meeting the needs of the disadvantaged than government
redistribution. But in a number of areas both the national government and state
governments have determined that this is not the case. For example, on the
justification that private charity is ineffectual to provide adequate health care to the
elderly and the poor, federal and state governments use coercive taxation to fund
Medicare and Medicaid programs.
An alternative explanation for the charitable deduction is that charity has value.
Charity might be understood as a basic good, or as an instantiation of the basic good
of practical reasonableness. But in either case it seems uncontroversial to observe
that charity is both objectively good and reflexive in nature. That is, charity is
valuable in and of itself, but the value of charity depends upon it being freely chosen.
To coerce someone to be generous does not make that person charitable, it simply
separates that person from his or her money.
Charity, like all reflexive goods, must be internalized by the exercise of personal
autonomy. The act of charity has a profound effect on the donor’s identity; it makes
the donor, to borrow from Finnis, “a different sort of person.”129 It makes a
difference not only to the material condition of the recipient but also to the moral
condition of the donor herself—her character. The donor realizes something of
value by giving freely and internalizes this value into her identity, as she makes the
well-being of the recipient a new reason for her own action.
The charitable act could not have this effect upon the charitable person if it were
coerced. One who is required by law to part with her money for the material comfort
of another is not making the material comfort of the other person a reason for her
action. Instead, the coercion is the reason for her action. She might, if she is a
naturally empathetic and caring person, nevertheless internalize care and concern for
poor people generally. But she will not have established a moral connection with a
particular recipient. Nor will she have created for herself a new reason to behave in
a generous manner.
All of this seems quite consistent with the observations of Finnis and George
about the reflexivity of some basic goods. And this has important implications for
the autonomy wars described in the Introduction. Authoritative Paternalism
occasionally overreaches because it fails to account for the reflexivity of some
goods, such as charity and practical reasonableness. The stated objective of
requiring citizens to undertake certain economic actions, such as purchasing health
insurance and paying taxes to support social safety nets, is not merely to provide for
the needs of others but also to make citizens more responsible. But the coercion
used to achieve that end makes the end unachievable. When the government
requires citizens to provide financial support for social programs it deprives them of
the opportunity to choose. And if they cannot choose, then citizens do not make
charity a reason for their future actions.
D. Assisted Suicide
Lesson Four: Some Autonomous Acts Are Valueless
When Montana became the third state to legalize assisting suicide, joining
Washington and Oregon, it left Idaho as a regional outlier. In contrast to its
129

FINNIS, MORAL ABSOLUTES, supra note 21, at 20.
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neighbors, Idaho has not abolished the common law prohibition against the
assistance of suicide. Instead, Idaho retains the common law, which treats assisting
suicide as a crime. Is Idaho reasonable to hold out against the regional trend? If
Idaho were simply to look around at its neighbors it might have cause to doubt its
position.
Some claim that respect for personal autonomy places principled limits on the
state’s interest in preserving life.130 That is, the case for legalizing assisted suicide
rests not merely, or even predominantly, on practical arguments about alleviating
suffering; it is not a matter of contingent judgment about prudential considerations.
Rather, as the argument goes, the moral case for prohibiting assisted suicide, which
begins with a principle of respect for human life, is in conflict with a moral case for
legalizing assisted suicide, which rests upon a principle of respect for personal
autonomy. The only way to resolve the ostensible conflict between the value of life
and the value of autonomy is to legalize self-harmful autonomous acts, such as
receiving assistance in suicide.131
Thus one legalization proponent argues that each individual ought to be free to
“lead a life that makes use of her distinctive abilities and satisfies her particular
aspirations and desires.”132 The valuation of human life is a matter of subjective
judgment about how fulfilling one’s life actually is, and suicide is “an appropriate,
though not obligatory, response when there is no further possibility of living a
fulfilling life.”133 In other words, any value in life is to be found only in the extrinsic
ends that it serves. When those ends cease to be valuable, it is reasonable to destroy
one’s own life.
This assessment of the value of human life rests upon a conception of
Untrammeled Autonomy, which takes self-made reasons to be the only reasons for
130
Jo Samanta, Lasting Powers of Attorney for Healthcare Under the Mental Capacity Act
2005: Enhanced Prospective Self-Determination For Future Incapacity or a Simulacrum?, 17
MED. L. REV. 377, 388-89 (2009).

131
The district court in Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 850 F. Supp. 1454 (W.D.
Wash. 1994), began its search for a liberty interest by quoting the Casey mystery-of-life
passage, then framed the “underlying constitutional issue” as whether the state “can resolve
the profound spiritual and moral questions surrounding the end of life in so conclusive a
fashion as to deny categorically any option for a terminally ill, mentally competent person to
commit physician-assisted suicide.” Id. at 1460. The court dismissed the notion that saving
human life might justify burdening a right to suicide because “only one life is involved and
that person can voice his or her wishes.” Id.

Judge Reinhardt, who wrote the opinion for the en banc majority, also quoted the
Casey mystery-of-life passage then went on, “[l]ike the decision of [sic] whether or not to
have an abortion, the decision how and when to die is one of ‘the most intimate and personal
choices a person may make in a lifetime,’ a choice ‘central to personal dignity and
autonomy.’” See also Dying v. Washington, 79 F.3d 790, 813-14 (9th Cir. 1996) (quoting
Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992)).
132

Edward Rubin, Assisted Suicide, Morality, and Law: Why Prohibiting Assisted Suicide
Violates the Establishment Clause, 63 VAND. L. REV. 763, 778 (2010).
133

Id. at 780.
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action. If autonomy is the supreme value then all other human goods, including
human life, are contingent. There is no “uniform ethos,” no “higher purposes,”134 no
common goods. Human action should be directed only toward “self-defined goals
that will provide the most subjectively satisfying life.”135
If this argument holds, and the value of human life is contingent, as a matter of
subjective evaluation, then the moral case for legalizing assisted suicide deserves
careful attention. But the judgments of state lawmakers reflect ambivalence, at most,
about the principled case for respecting personal autonomy in the area of assisted
suicide. A survey of state laws discloses a much more limited role for personal
autonomy in this area. Only three states—Oregon, Washington, and Montana—have
de-criminalized assisted suicide. The other forty-seven states maintain criminal
penalties for the act. And though no state punishes the act of suicide itself, no state
law expressly permits it.
Proponents of legalizing assisted suicide sometimes point out that states do not
punish the act of suicide itself.136 But this fact cannot bear the weight that
legalization proponents would place on it. In its landmark Glucksberg decision, the
Supreme Court recognized that de-criminalization of suicide “did not represent an
acceptance of suicide; rather, as [Connecticut] Chief Justice [Zephania] Swift
observed, this change reflected the growing consensus that it was unfair to punish
the suicide’s family for his wrongdoing.”137 Justice Souter wrote separately to
advocate for a liberty interest in assisted suicide. He nevertheless acknowledged that
the state abolished punishments for suicide “largely because the common-law
punishment of forfeiture was rejected as improperly penalizing an innocent
family.”138
Further evidence that de-criminalization was primarily about the effects of
punishment, and not about permitting or approving suicide, can be found in state
case reports. Despite the inefficacy of punishing suicide, many states continue to
identify volitional suicide as a crime139—an act that is “ethically reprehensible and
inconsistent with the public welfare,”140 and “unlawful and criminal as malum in
se.”141 Less than 40 years ago the Supreme Court acknowledged constitutionally
unchallenged prohibitions against suicide.142 As one state court explained, “[s]uicide
134

Id. at 778.

135

Id.

136

See, e.g., OLREE, supra note 5, at 205.

137

Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 713 (1997).

138
Id. at 774. If anything, the abolition of criminal sanctions for suicide in the United
States and Great Britain was accomplished, “not to help people commit suicide, but to help
them not to.” John Keown, The Legal Revolution: From ‘Sanctity of Life’ to ‘Quality of Life’
and ‘Autonomy’, 14 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 253, 279 (1998). The general belief
now prevails that a suicidal person needs help, not punishment. Id.
139

Thomas J. Marzen et al., Suicide: A Constitutional Right?, 24 DUQUESNE L. REV. 1, 7982 (1985).
140

May v. Pennell, 64 A. 885, 886 (Me. 1906).

141

Commonwealth v. Mink, 123 Mass. 422, 429 (1877).

142

Paris Adult Theater I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 68 n.15 (1973).
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is none the less criminal because no punishment can be inflicted. It may not be
indictable because the dead cannot be indicted.”143
Not only criminal law but also state property law expresses disapprobation of
volitional suicide.
Indeed, autonomous suicidal acts actually earn greater
disapproval in state property law than suicidal acts that are driven by depression or
mental illness. A freely-chosen suicide cannot serve as the anticipated death that
completes a gift causa mortis.144 This prohibition is justified on the ground that the
courts should not honor a gift that was conditioned upon “the commission of a
felony by the giver, and that felony [is] of the highest form.”145 The unenforceable
gift is conditioned upon a “grave public wrong.”146 Enforcement would be
inconsistent with states’ “consistent views disfavoring suicide.”147
State budgetary priorities reflect disapprobation of suicide. Even the few states
that have de-criminalized assisted suicide today invest resources in suicide
prevention. Like many other states, Washington subsidizes crisis counseling
services to dissuade suicidal acts.148 Counselors employed in that state apparently
have the unenviable task of distinguishing between those suicidal decisions that are
worthy of deference and those that are not.
State tort law also aims to discourage suicide. Most states recognize in law a
privilege from tort liability for intervening in a suicide attempt.149 The privilege
covers any interference in self-destruction or self-injury. Also, many states permit
involuntary commitment of one who, due to a mental illness, is likely to harm
himself.150 Significantly, these laws make no provision for subjective or utilitarian
143

State v. Carney, 55 A. 44 (N.J. 1903). See also McMahan v. State, 53 So. 89, 90 (Ala.
1910); State v. Willis, 121 S.E.2d 854, 856 (N.C. 1961). “No sophistry is tolerated in
consideration of legal problems which seek to justify self-destruction as commendable or even
a matter of personal right.” Blackwood v. Jones, 149 So. 600, 601 (Fla. 1933).
144

Adam J. MacLeod, A Gift Worth Dying For?: Debating the Volitional Nature of Suicide
in the Law of Personal Property, 45 IDAHO L. REV. 93 (2008), and the cases cited therein.
145

Agnew v. Belfast Banking Co., [1892] 2 I.R. 204, 213.

146

Bainbridge v. Hoes, 149 N.Y.S. 20, 22 (App. Div. 1914). See also In re Fanning,
[1922] 3 D.L.R. 925, 926 (Can.); In re Dudman, [1925] Ch. 553-54 (Eng.).
147
In re Estate of Smith, 694 A.2d 1099, 1105 n.4 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1997) (Cirillo, J.,
dissenting).
148

See,
e.g.,
Wash.
State
Univ.
Counseling
http://counsel.wsu.edu/Default.asp (last viewed Oct. 15, 2011).

and

Testing

Services,

149

NEIL M. GORSUCH, THE FUTURE OF ASSISTED SUICIDE AND EUTHANASIA 32 (2006);
Marzen et al., supra note 139, at 148-242. New York’s statute is illustrative.
The use of physical force upon another person which would otherwise constitute an
offense is justifiable and not criminal under any of the following circumstances: . . .
A person acting under a reasonable belief that another person is about to commit
suicide or to inflict serious physical injury upon himself may use physical force
upon such person to the extent that he reasonably believes it necessary to thwart
such result.
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 35.10 (McKinney 2009).
150

Marzen et al., supra note 139, at 148-242.
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valuations of life. The person who interferes in the suicidal act is not required to
weigh the instrumental value of the life saved, either to the suicidal person or to the
community. This reflects the intrinsic, non-contingent value of human life. A
suicide harms both the individual and the community simply because it causes the
loss of a human life; the value of the life is neither subjective nor relative to other
considerations.
So, forty-seven states prohibit assisted suicide. And the other three retain
numerous legal provisions designed to discourage and even prevent suicide. Are all
of these laws rational? Are there good reasons for states to limit the freedom of
citizens to give and receive assistance in committing suicide? In short, yes. The
most important of these reasons is what some philosophers call the inviolability-oflife principle.151 This principle has a long history in both philosophy and law. It has
been recognized “in most, if not all, civilised [sic] societies throughout the modern
world.”152 And it is still reflected today in the provisions of state law just
considered.
The inviolability-of-life principle holds that human life is a basic good. It is one
of those goods that Raz, Dworkin, Finnis, and George all affirmed has intrinsic
value; it is valuable in and of itself. It follows that, since human life is a reason for
action in itself, one can and should refrain from “actions intended to do it harm.”153
The inviolability-of-life principle rules out assisted suicide and euthanasia,
though it does not require that measures must always be taken to keep human beings
alive.154 Sometimes one’s reason for choosing life might be defeated by some other
reason, but it can never be reasonable to intend to cause death, to have the
destruction of life as one’s purpose. So, for example, a fireman or a soldier who
risks his own life to save another, knowing that his death might result, but not
intending it, acts reasonably. Similarly, one who refuses a drastic and intrusive
medical treatment that might (or might not) save one’s life is not committing
suicide.155 But one never has a reason deliberately to destroy innocent human life,

151

GORSUCH, supra note 149, at 167; John Keown & David Jones, Surveying the
Foundations of Medical Law: A Reassessment of Glanville Williams’s The Sanctity of Life
and the Criminal Law, 16 MED. L. REV. 85, 95-101, 118-24 (2008).
152

Keown & Jones, supra note 151, at 95.

153

GORSUCH, supra note 149, at 164.

154

Id. at 218. Gorsuch observes, “[w]hile laws against assisted suicide plainly restrict
some choice, consistent with the inviolability-of-life principle, they restrict only a limited
arena of human actions—those intended to kill.” Id. at 167 (emphasis in original). The
inviolability-of-life principle does not entail that the government should prohibit or prosecute
every act by which human life is foreseeably taken. The principle preserves “significant
liberty to patient and doctor alike to discontinue or apply palliative treatment even in
circumstances where death is foreseen as a certainty.” Id. at 168. In these cases, and in other
cases where death is a foreseeable but unintended, secondary consequence of reasonable
actions, the state should not trample upon autonomous choices.
155
In these cases Finnis observes, “[o]ne’s death is not chosen, for it is neither one’s end,
nor a means to one’s end, but a side-effect, foreseen and accepted (but not intended, not
chosen), of one’s choice to reject the burden.” John Finnis, The “Value of Human Life” and
“The Right to Death”: Some Reflections on Cruzan and Ronald Dworkin, 17 S. ILL. U. L.J.
559, 565 (1993).
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even one’s own life. For the same reason, it can never be reasonable to assist
another person in taking her own life. Thus, states reasonably prohibit assisted
suicide.
That states treat human life as inviolable suggests an important limitation upon
personal autonomy. Suicide consists of the deliberate destruction of a basic human
good (life) for the realization of no other intelligible good.156 It is thus an irrational
act. That suicide is performed autonomously does not render the act reasonable, say
state lawmakers. Indeed, an autonomous suicide destroys autonomy itself. When a
life ends, all of the exercises of personal autonomy that we recognize as valuable
also come to an end. By its very operation the act of suicide assures that the actor
will never again realize any valuable ends, including those goods that are reflexive in
nature.157
E. Compulsory Education Laws
Lesson Five: Not All Basic Goods Appear to Be Reflexive

John Keown and David Jones have memorably explained the distinction between chosen
death and death as a side effect. To claim that the heroism of personal sacrifice justifies
suicide is to embrace the fallacy “that because heroes or martyrs foresee death, they therefore
intend death.” Keown & Jones, supra note 151, at 118-19. On this mistaken view, “both
Judas and Jesus were suicides.” Id. at 119.
156
Some claim that the destruction of human life performed to avoid extreme suffering
does serve an intelligible end, namely the avoidance of suffering. See, e.g., PETER SINGER,
WRITINGS ON AN ETHICAL LIFE 194 (2000). However, avoidance of suffering is not intelligible
as a reason for action, though it is certainly understandable as a sub-rational motivation. A
moment’s reflection reveals that avoiding some suffering actually causes harm, as where one
refuses to go to the dentist to have a rotten tooth removed. Indeed, the realization of many
good ends entails suffering. I cannot remain healthy without exercising, which is usually
uncomfortable. I cannot establish a friendship without taking an interest in another person,
which entails setting aside my own vanity and self-importance, disciplines that I, a particularly
vain and self-important person, naturally experience as sacrifices.

On the other hand, suffering is not an intelligible end; one who chooses suffering for its
own sake acts irrationally. Suffering and avoidance of suffering, then, are morally neutral.
One cannot discern whether the sub-rational desire to avoid this or that particular instance of
suffering is consistent with reason until one considers whether the suffering in this or that
particular case will accrue to the sufferer’s benefit or harm. In order to answer that question,
one must look beyond suffering for intelligible reasons for action. And because a reason for
action, such as human life, can never be defeated by a sub-rational motivation, such as the
desire to avoid suffering, one’s reason for choosing life can never be defeated by a desire to
avoid pain or suffering.
157

For this reason, “assisted suicide does not enhance freedom.” Scott FitzGibbon, The
Failure of the Freedom-Based and Utilitarian Arguments for Assisted Suicide, 42 AM. J.
JURIS. 211, 212 (1997). Rather, it “violates the subject’s freedom because it puts an end to
further activities and projects.” Id. at 213. Furthermore, it “violates commitments he may
have made” in the past, those reasons that he created for himself through the autonomous
process of self-determination. Id.
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Every state requires children either to attend school or to obtain an equivalent
education elsewhere.158 By requiring children and their parents affirmatively to
pursue educational goals, these laws burden a liberty interest.159 The Supreme Court
in 1925 held that a state compulsory education law, which required all children to
attend public schools, unreasonably interfered with the liberty of parents and
guardians to direct the upbringing and education of children in their custody.160 The
Court reasoned,
[t]he fundamental theory of liberty upon which all governments in this
Union repose excludes any general power of the state to standardize its
children by forcing them to accept instruction from public teachers only.
The child is not the mere creature of the state; those who nurture him and
direct his destiny have the right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize
and prepare him for additional obligations.161
Thus, as the Court later affirmed in Wisconsin v. Yoder,162 parents retain the right to
direct the manner and venues in which their children will be educated.
Nevertheless, this liberty interest does not free parents and children from the
reach of state educational requirements altogether. The Court in Pierce noted that no
question was raised about the power of states to regulate schools, to require that all
children of proper age attend some school, and to require the teaching of “certain
studies plainly essential to good citizenship.”163 Coercion is permitted, within limits,
and as a means to particular ends.
Yoder did not disturb this ruling. In Yoder, the Supreme Court famously held
that Amish children could be exempted from compulsory education beyond the
eighth grade. But the justification for this decision was not a general liberty interest
but rather Free Exercise protection.164 The Amish claimants did not rest their claim
upon personal autonomy or personal preferences. To the contrary, obedience to their
religiously-informed consciences meant obedience to their community’s doctrines.165
Also, the Court in Yoder took pains to affirm the rationality of compulsory
education laws. “There is no doubt as to the power of a State,” the Court declaimed,
“having a high responsibility for education of its citizens, to impose reasonable
158

MARK G. YUDOF ET AL., EDUCATION POLICY AND THE LAW 1 (4th ed. 2002); Rebecca
Aviel, Compulsory Education and Substantive Due Process: Asserting Student Rights to a
Safe and Healthy School Facility, 10 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 201, 204 (2006); Notes, A Right
to Learn?: Improving Educational Outcomes Through Substantive Due Process, 120 Harv. L.
Rev. 1323, 1330 (2007) [hereinafter “Right to Learn”].
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Id. at 535.
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Id. at 215-18. As the Court recognized, the Amish way of life “is not merely a matter of
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https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol59/iss4/6

30

2011] THE MYSTERY OF LIFE IN THE LABORATORY OF DEMOCRACY 619
regulations for the control and duration of basic education.”166 The point, for present
purposes, is not that the Court perceived the value of knowledge resting in its
instrumental usefulness for producing good citizens. Rather, the point is that the
value of knowledge was not destroyed by the compulsion directed toward its
acquisition.
The rationality of compulsory education laws raises the possibility that coerced
pursuit of at least one basic good has intelligible value. If compulsory education
laws are reasonable then there must be some conclusive reason or reasons for them.
If knowledge is not a basic good, or if it is reflexive and its value is contingent on its
being freely chosen for the right reasons, there exists no intelligible reason to force
children to acquire it, or to force children’s parents to comply with the acquisition.
Similarly, unless aesthetic experience has intelligible value even when coerced
there would be no reason to require children to sit through music and art classes.
Unless health has intelligible value when coerced there would be no reason to
compel physical education. But of course knowledge, aesthetic experience, and
health do provide intelligible reasons for such laws. That every state has some form
of compulsory education law illustrates that rational minds grasp the value of these
coercive measures.
A principle of Untrammeled Autonomy should entail that compulsory education
laws are unjust. As Finnis has observed, the principle articulated in Casey should
entail that “since parents have a constitutionally protected right to provide non-State
education for their children if they so choose, they must equally have the right to
decide to give their children no education.”167
And the claim that autonomy is intrinsically valuable should entail that
compulsory education laws are irrational. To observe that children are different than
adults does not by itself resolve the problem. Some relevant difference between
children and adults might be a reason for not coercing adults to attend school, but it
cannot justify coercing children to attend school. To require the child’s attendance is
to override the autonomy of either the child or the parent, or both. That cannot be
justified except on consequentialist grounds, which is another way of saying that it
cannot be justified.
Alternatively, one might argue that children are not capable of exercising
autonomy because they do not create life plans the way that adults do.168 Or perhaps
they have a very limited capacity for autonomy because they do not make their own
reasons for action as adults do, or they do so imperfectly.169 Thus the state might
rationally coerce children to acquire knowledge without threatening children’s
autonomy. But just as this line of argument resolves one difficulty it raises other
problems. Children realize basic goods other than autonomy, such as life, health,
and knowledge. If autonomy is a basic good then one will expect it to be good for
children as it is for adults, just as the other basic goods are good for children. If
children lack the capacity for autonomy but enjoy the capacity to realize other basic
166
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goods, that fact would cast doubt upon the idea that autonomy is in fact equally as
basic as other goods.
More fundamentally, someone is exercising an autonomy interest in directing a
child’s education. If not the child, then a parent or guardian must have the capacity
and freedom to choose how the child will be educated. But state law does not
respect the autonomy of parents to decide whether the child will be educated. The
law recognizes a liberty interest in parents to choose the manner and method of
instruction, but that liberty interest does not include a right to leave the child in
ignorance.
It thus appears that the realization of some basic goods—at least knowledge,
aesthetic experience, and health—can rationally be coerced. At least all fifty states
and the United States Supreme Court think so. Therefore the value of some goods
does not depend in any way on the exercise of personal autonomy. This assessment
appears to meet widespread acceptance among lawmakers.
F. Legalized Marijuana Use
Lesson Six: Neither a Principle of Personal Autonomy nor the Unconditional
Value of Some Basic Goods Conclusively Resolves Every Controversial Legal Issue
Several states have recently decriminalized simple possession and use of
marijuana.170 This policy decision implicates both autonomy and the protection of
other goods, such as health and practical reasonableness. But unlike the areas of
state law considered above, the controversy in this corner does not admit an obvious
answer. It is instructive to examine why not.
The argument for criminalization proceeds from the observation that recreational
marijuana use injures a basic human good, namely health, in service of no other
rational end. (The pleasure that the user experiences is a sub-rational motivation, not
a reason for using.) Furthermore, many marijuana users become addicted to
marijuana and more destructive substances. These addictions often injure the user’s
relationships with other people, causing harm to the basic good of community.
Health and community are non-reflexive basic goods; they retain their intelligible
value even when they are not freely chosen. To deter injury to these goods, the state
reasonably prohibits marijuana use and possession.
But this case can easily be overstated. Some chemical substances have greater
deleterious effects than others. Alcohol is more or less destructive than marijuana,
and both are arguably less destructive than heroin. And states permit the
consumption of alcohol, in moderation and with certain restrictions, so why not
marijuana? Once we frankly acknowledge that we are engaged in line drawing, how
do we avoid being arbitrary about it?
The argument for legalization proceeds from the observation that criminalization
will also harm the drug user in an important way, by deflecting the user from
170
See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. §§ 17.37.010 to .080 (2011). According to one organization
that keeps track, fifteen states have now legalized some uses of marijuana, and twelve
additional states have pending legislation on the subject. 16 Legal Medical Marijuana States
and
D.C.,
PROCON.ORG,
http://medicalmarijuana.procon.org/view.resource.php?resourceID=000881 (last visited Oct.
15, 2011); 6 States with Pending Legislation to Legalize Medical Marijuana, PROCON.ORG,
http://medicalmarijuana.procon.org/view.resource.php?resourceID=002481 (last visited Oct.
15, 2011).
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realizing the goods of autonomy and practical reasonableness. One does not act
freely or uprightly when one chooses to avoid drug abuse only out of fear of
punishment. However, it is easy to overstate this case, as well. It is particularly easy
to underestimate the harm to users and their friends and family that results from
much use and abuse of narcotics.
Moreover, legalization itself might deflect some marijuana users from exercising
practical reasonableness, particularly those who are prone to abuse the drug. George
observes that prohibiting harmful acts protects both the potential victims of harm and
the immoral actors themselves. “For, by deterring such acts, the law may prevent
people from habituating themselves to corrupting vices which will more or less
gradually erode their character and will to resist.”171 Drug addiction, of course, is the
paradigmatic instance of habituation to a corrupting vice, which erodes the character
and will of the user.
So it might reasonably be argued that the degree of harm from either
criminalization or legalization is less than immediately clear. Even when confined to
moral considerations, this is a complicated issue. It becomes even more complicated
once one includes prudential considerations. Will legalization or criminalization
more dramatically incentivize a criminal black market in narcotics? Does
criminalization actually deter potential users? Does it deter addicts? These
questions admit of empirical answers, but that does not make them easy questions to
resolve.
IV. CONCLUSION
What can be said about personal autonomy then? State lawmakers by and large
reject both Untrammeled Autonomy and Authoritative Paternalism. With Raz,
Finnis, George, and Dworkin, and against the Untrammeled Autonomists, they
affirm that the value of autonomy is limited, and that one cannot make an
unreasonable act reasonable simply by choosing it. With Raz, Finnis, George, and
Dworkin, and against the Authoritative Paternalists, they also affirm that personal
autonomy is an important condition of human flourishing because it enables people
to make pre-moral choices and to realize reflexive basic goods.
More can be said. State lawmakers apparently believe personal autonomy to be
an important principle with moral implications. But they recognize important
limitations upon the reach of that principle. Personal autonomy is reasonably
curtailed when exercised to cause harm. Though it must be protected to enable
people space to make pre-moral choices, and to realize reflexive basic goods, it need
not be respected in all cases. The value of at least one basic good—human life—
cannot reasonably be reduced to mere instrumentality for the sake of respecting
personal autonomy. And autonomy adds nothing of value to an irrational act, such
as suicide. Some goods—knowledge, aesthetic experience, and health—are
reasonably realized through coercive means.
So some clear principles emerge. But there remains significant room for
reasonable disagreement about the role and limitations of personal autonomy in areas
of public policy where these clear principles are not in play. The law need not
prohibit every harmful or irresponsible act. And there are good reasons to believe
that it should not do so. Therefore lawmakers who seek to do good with intellectual
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humility will recognize that many questions are not easily resolved simply by
invoking or rejecting a principle of personal autonomy.
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